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Sindell and Beyond: A Case for
Imposing Punitive Damages in Market

Share Litigation
In an age of mass production of complex goods about which con-

sumers have little understanding, society relies heavily on manufacturers to provide an adequate and safe product. The societal interest

in requiring manufacturers to provide safe products is reflected in
modern strict products liability law.' During the last century, manufacturer liability has increased tremendously as the courts have lessened
some elements of proof traditionally required to state a cause of
action.2
Early products liability cases required privity of contract between
the plaintiff and defendant 3 as well as proof of defendant's fault. 4
In 1916, however, the New York Court of Appeals held that the privity
requirement should be removed in suits involving products which, when
negligently made, would endanger life and limb.' Within the last
twenty-five years all states have abandoned the privity requirement
in products liability cases and now include many non-manufacturers
as possible defendants.6 The fault requirement has also been eliminated
1. For a detailed history of products liability, see generally Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 928 (1957); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Schwarz, Foreward: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979); Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Productsand Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rtv. 363 (1965).
2. See infra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
3. The origin of the privity requirement was the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.1842). The Winterbottom court held that since a coach passenger was
not in privity of contract with the defendant, the plaintiff had no cause of action for breach
of a contract to keep the coach in good repair. Id. at 405. Although Winterbottom was an
action in contract, the decision was interpreted to mean that privity would also be required
in tort actions. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, AND D. OwaN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAWv OF TORTS, 357 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited PROSSER & KEETON].
4. Plaintiffs were required to show that defendant was at least negligent in tort actions.
See Comment, Market Share Liabilityfor Defective Products:An Ill-Advised Remedy for the
Problem of Identification, 76 N.W. U.L. REv. 300, 306.
5. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (Judge Cardozo eliminated the privity requirement in any negligence action in which it was reasonably
foreseeable that a product could cause substantial harm if defective).
6. The numerous exceptions to the privity requirement that have evolved in recent years
illustrate that lack of privity hardly hinders products liability suits today. See, e.g., Kosters
v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 1979) (franchisor held liable); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 51, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 556-57 (1965) (wholesaler held
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in modern strict products liability law. Plaintiffs in early products

liability actions were required to prove that a manufacturer was at
least negligent. 7 Today, however, evidence of due care by manufacturers is irrelevant if a plaintiff can show that the injurious product
is defective.' In 1980, the California Supreme Court removed yet
another element of proof required in certain strict products liability
actions. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,9 the court held that when
the plaintiff names a substantial percentage of the manufacturers of
a fungible good as defendants in an action, the plaintiff need not
prove which defendant actually manufactured the good that caused
the plaintiff's injury.'" Once the plaintiff proves that the fungible good
caused the injury, the burden of disproving causation falls upon each
defendant." This doctrine represents a drastic departure from the traditional rule that plaintiffs must show which particular defendant caused

their injuries. 12
The market share doctrine could have enormous implications." Many
products today are produced by different manufacturers using idenliable); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964) (retailer held liable although no privity); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
Rental Service, 212 A.2d 769, 781 (N.J. 1965) (lessor held liable); Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 100 (N.J. 1960) (purchaser's wife recovered absent privity); Salvador
v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 904 (Pa. 1974) (purchaser's employee recovered
despite absence of privity); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1976)
(successor corporation held liable); Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831-32 (Wis. 1972)
(innocent bystander recovered).
7. See Comment, supra note 4, at 306.
8. Nearly every court today has adopted some form of strict liability in tort. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THm LAw OF TORTS 657-58 (4th ed. 1971). In those jurisdictions that
adopt strict liability, a plaintiff may still sue a defendant on a negligence theory in the alternative. In strict liability, however, the plaintiff need not prove the manufacturer was negligent
in producing the good. PROSSER & KETON, suPRA note 3, at 694. The first case imposing
strict liabiity in tort was Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The Greenman doctrine was subsequently adopted in the Second
Restatement Of Torts section 402A. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such a product and (b) it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A.
9. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).

10.
11.

Id.
Id.

12. See Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34
REv. 1623, 1623 (1981).
13. Id. at 1623; Comment, supra note 4, at 302-03.
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tical formulas." Victims injured by these "generic" products may frequently be unable to identify which manufacturer produced the specific
good that caused the harm.' 5 Conceivably, thousands of people could
be affected by this relaxation of the causation requirement.' 6
Modern California courts often uphold the right of plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages in products liability actions.' 7 A question
remains, however, as to whether the doctrine of punitive damages
can appropriately be implemented within the market share liability
context.' 8 In at least some market share cases, the imposition of
punitive damages would seem appropriate.' 9 As some have suggested,
however, the threat of bankrupting the defendant, and therefore leaving
no assets available for latecomers seeking compensatory awards, may
be a pertinent concern in this area of potentially mass liability. 20 The
Sindell decision did not address the applicability of punitive damages
in the market share context.'
Two courts in California have ruled on the issue of the imposition
of punitive damages in actions tried under the market share theory
of liability. A federal district court in California2 2 held that an assessment of punitive damages was feasible in a market share context. 23
After considering the same issue, a California appellate court 24 held
14. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 1652.
15. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
16. Numerous products on the market today may cause injury to many or all of that
product's consumers. See, e.g., infra note 69. See also, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory
of Recovery, 46 FORDHAM L. Ray. 963 (1978) "The DES cases are only the tip of an iceberg".
Id. at 1007.
17. In 1958 the California Supreme Court stated that "punitive damages are not a favorite
of the law and the granting of them should be with the greatest of caution." Gombos v. Ashe
158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958). Today, however, courts are imposing
punitive damages more frequently on defendants who act with malice, especially in the products liability area. See, e.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 402-03, 650 P.2d
1171, 1179-80, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 662-63 (1982); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382-83 (1981); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 26-27, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220-21 (1975); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 415-16 (1967).
18. See infra notes 123-84 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 123-84 and accompanying text.
20. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (1966) reh'g denied (May 8, 1967);
Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1985). See Comment,
Punitive Damages in DES Market Share Litigation, 23 SANTA CLARA L. Ry. 185, 186 (1983).
21. The Sindell court acknowledged that Judith Sindell was seeking punitive, as well as
compensatory damages. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 590, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
The decision, however, is framed in terms of compensatory liability, and does not discuss the
punitive damages issue raised in the complaint. Therefore, the question of whether punitive
damages are allowable in a market share liability action is open for speculation.
22. Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (1983) (U.S. District Court, C.
D. California).
23. Id. at 1330.
24.. Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 213 Cal.Rptr. 547 (1985) (Second
District Court of Appeal).
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that exemplary damages were inappropriate in market share cases. 23
This comment will first discuss the theory of Sindell and the implications of that decision. 26 Next, the doctrine of punitive damages
as it has evolved in California will be outlined.17 The conflicting decisions of the California appellate court and the federal district court
in California as to whether punitive damages are appropriate in a
market share context will follow. 2 8 This comment will then show that
the better reasoned view favors the imposition of punitive damages
in market share litigation.2 9 Finally, an approach to overcoming the
procedural difficulties inherent in adopting punitive damages in market
share litigation will be suggested. 30
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY DOCTRINE

As a general rule, tort plaintiffs are required to prove that their
injuries were caused by the defendant or an instrumentality within
the defendant's control.3 In products liability, however, when the
plaintiff is able to prove all elements of the cause of action except
the identity of the wrongdoer, some exceptions to the identification
requirement are recognized.32 Perhaps the most radical of these
25. Id. at 890, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 554.
26. See infra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 78-122 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 123-155 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 156-184 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 185-236 and accompanying text.
31. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 712-13.
32. One exception originated in the renowned case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,
199 P.2d 1 (1948). This exception provides that when the conduct of two or more actors is
tortious, and the plaintiff proves that the harm has been caused by only one of the defendants,
but is uncertain as to which one, the burden is upon each defendant to prove that defendant
has not caused the harm. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. The doctrine of alternative liability was
subsequently embodied in the Second Restatement Of Torts section 433B (1965).
Another exception to the identification requirement is contained in the Second Restatement
Of Torts section 876 (1965). Under this doctrine, a defendant is subject to liability for the
harm of a third person if that defendant does an act in concert with another or pursuant
to a common design with another, or knowingly gives substantial assistance to one whose conduct is in breach of a duty, or substantially assists the other in accomplishing a tortious result
with the defendant's own conduct constituting a breach of duty to a third person. See Bichler
v. Eli Lilly, 436 N.E. 2d 182 (N.Y 1982).
The final exception was deemed industry-wide liability. This doctrine was created in Hall v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp 353, (E.D. N.Y. 1972). That case held
that defendants, by adhering to a deficient industry-wide standard, maintained joint control
of the risk of defective products, and this was sufficient to hold any member of the industry
liable when the particular manufacturer responsible for the harm could not be identified. Id,
According to Sindell, however, Hall's strength as authority is uncertain. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d
at 607 n.22, 607 P.2d at 934 n.22, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.22. The Hall court discussed enterprise liability, but then severed the claims at defendants' requests before concluding. Id. The
status of the severed cases is unknown except for some decided in favor of defendants for
other reasons. Id.
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exceptions is the market share theory first recognized in Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories.3 The creation of the market share doctrine in
Sindell resulted from the marketing of a drug known as
diethylstilbestrol (DES), which is a synthetic form of the female hormone estrogen. 34 DES was first synthesized in 1937. 3 1 By 1941, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved applications by
many pharmaceutical companies to market the drug.36 None of the
reasons for which approval was first given related to pregnancy. 7
In 1947, the FDA approved the use of the drug for preventing miscarriage. 38 This use was on an experimental basis, and required a warning. 39 Between 1947 and 1971, the drug was widely used for the prevention of miscarriage. 0
In 1971, the FDA withdrew approval of the drug for the purpose
of preventing miscarriages after receiving evidence that the use of DES
was causally connected with the development of vaginal and cervical
clear cell adenocarcinoma 4 in the daughters of DES users.4 2 Today

at least 500,000 DES daughters suffer from clear cell adenocarcinoma
of the vagina and uterus and other conditions caused by their mothers'
ingestion of DES. 43 Judith Sindell was one of these victims.
Sindell sued eleven California DES manufacturers for compensatory
and punitive damages." Sindell, however, faced what could have been

an insurmountable hurdle under traditional tort doctrines because she
could not identify the particular manufacturer that produced the drug
33. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
34. See Comment, supra note 16, at 963.
35. See Comment, supra note 20, at 187.
36. Id. DES provided an effective and inexpensive remedy for various ailments suffered
by women with low levels of natural estrogen. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 187-88.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 188. Between 94 and 300 pharmaceutical companies are estimated to have manufactured DES for pregnancy purposes. See Comment, supra note 16, at 964 n.3.
41. Adenocarcinoma is a rare form of cancer. Comment, supra note 20, at 188 n.14.
42. See Comment, supra note 20, at 188. Hervst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully,
Epidemiologic Aspects and Factors Related to Survival in 384 Registry Cases of Clear Cell
Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 135 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 876 (1979). A recent
case indicates at least one DES son also exists. A jury verdict was given to a man who claimed
his defective genito-urinary system was the result of his mother's ingestion of DES during her
pregnancy with him. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 82-3515 (D. D.C., filed June 28, 1985).
43. See Comment, supra note 20, at 189; Comment, supra note 16, at 965.
44. One defendant proved that DES was not manufactured by that company during the
period plaintiff's mother had taken the drug. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d
at 927 n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4. All but five other defendants named in the complaint
were either dismissed or their appeals were abandoned for various reasons. Id. The respondents
in the action at the California Supreme Court were Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., E.R.
Squibb and Sons, The Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company. Id.
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her mother took.'" When Sindell's case reached the California Supreme
Court, the court indicated a willingness to provide a remedy despite
Sindell's inability to prove causation. 46 The court, however, rejected
47
as inappropriate the established exceptions to the proof requirement
in favor of creating a new doctrine."
The Sindell court stated that in contemporary society, scientific and
technological advances have created many goods that harm consumers
and cannot be traced to any specific manufacturer. 49 The decision
recognized that courts today could either adhere to established tort
doctrines, thereby denying recovery to many victims of harmful generic
products, or could fashion new remedies to meet the needs of contemporary society.5" In creating a new remedy, the court held that
the plaintiff need not prove which defendant actually manufactured
the product that caused the injury if a substantial percentage,, of the
manufacturers in the relevant market are named as defendants.5 2 Once
the plaintiff establishes that the product caused that plaintiff's injury, the burden shifts to the individual defendants to show that they
could not have been responsible for the injury." Absent this showing, each defendant would be held liable for that percentage of the
plaintiff's damages which represented the defendant's share in the
54
market at the time the harm occurred.
45. DES is a generic drug. Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 141. The formula for DES is a scientific constant. The formula is set forth in the United
States Pharmacopoeia, and any manufacturer producing that drug must utilize the formula
set forth therein. 21 U.S.C. §351(b). Id. An identical formula was used by as many as 300
different companies who manufactured DES. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 1625. While the
drug was on the market, pharmacists used whatever brand of DES they happened to have
on hand to fill prescriptions. Id. Identification of the source of a particular drug was nearly
impossible because of the inadequacy of records kept by the pharmacists. Id.
46. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 600, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court
stated: "Should we require that plaintiff identify the manufacturer which supplied the DES
used by her mother... she would effectively be precluded from any recovery.... There are however,
forceful arguments in favor of holding that plaintiff has a cause of action." Id.
47. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. See supra note
32 (exceptions to requirement that plaintiff prove causation).
48. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
49. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
50. Id.
51. The court did not define "substantial percentage," but did reject the suggestion of
seventy-five to eighty percent, which was proposed. Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This suggestion was proposed by the law review comment upon
which the market share theory was based. See Comment, supra note 16, at 996.
52. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
53. Id.
54. The Sindell decision may require defendants to pay 100 percent of plaintiff's damages
although less than 100 percent of the market is present. The Sindell court declared that, "Each
defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of
that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plain-
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The court gave three policy reasons for the decision. First, as between an innocent plaintiff and a manufacturer of a defective pro-

duct, the latter should bear the cost of the injury.

5

In this situation,

the plaintiff is not to blame for the failure to produce evidence of
causation. The absence of such evidence is not attributable to the

manufacturers either. The manufacturers' conduct in marketing a product whose effects are delayed for a long period of time, however,

played a significant role in the unavailability of the proof. 6 Since
this delayed effect is a significant factor in the unavailability of proof,
57
the manufacturers are "more at fault" than the plaintiff.

The next policy reason supporting the Sindell decision was that the

manufacturer is in a better position to bear the cost involved in an
injury. The cost of injury is potentially devastating to an individual 9
The court reasoned that an individual need not bear this cost since
the risk of injury can be insured against by the manufacturer
and
60
distributed among consumers as a cost of doing business.
Finally, the Sindell court reasoned that since the manufacturer is
in the best position to recognize defects in products and to guard

against them, holding the producer liable for these defects would provide an incentive to product safety. 6' The significance of these con-

siderations in the area of medication was also stressed.62 The contiflt's injuries." Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This language is unclear.
At first glance, the statement seems to say that if only 60 percent of the market is present,
then plaintiff will only recover 60 percent of the judgment. The court, however, continued
to say that once a plaintiff met her burden of joining a "substantial share" of the market,
defendants could cross-complain against other manufacturers who may have supplied the injurious product. Id. The defendants would have no apparent reason for cross-complaining except
to seek contribution. Contribution may be sought only in cases in which the joined defendants
may be held liable for more than their pro rata share of the judgment. See E.B. Willis Co.
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976). Thus, the more likely
interpretation of the language of the Sindell decision is that the joined defendants will be held
liable for 100 percent of plaintiff's judgment. For example, assume four manufacturers are
named as defendants and they each represent twenty percent of the market. If a defendant
is liable only for the amount that represents that company's share in the market, then each
would pay $20,000 of a $100,000 judgment. Under the method more likely to have been intended by the Sindell court, however, each would pay one-fourth of the $100,000, or $25,000.
For more detailed discussions of this issue, see Fischer, supra note 12, at 1645-47; Note, Market
Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for. DES Litigants, 30 CrAq. U.L. REv. 551,
574 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability-The California Roulette of Causation Eliminating the
Identification Requirement-Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980), 11 SEToN HALL L. RE. 610, 621 (1981).
55. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

1451

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17

sumer's general lack of knowledge about the contents of a particular
medicine renders the consumer especially powerless to prevent serious
63
harm.
DES daughters have been given a greater opportunity to recover
for their injuries since the establishment of the market share doctrine.64 Many other victims, who are similarly unable to identify the
tortfeasor who caused their injuries because of the generic nature of
the injurious product, may also be rewarded by the institution of the
market share theory. 6 Nevertheless, the doctrine has been subject to
much criticism.66 Several other states have adopted at least a modified,
have expressly rejected the
version of the Sindell doctrine,6 but some
68
application of the market share theory.
Manufacturer liability under the market share theory may be
widespread since the doctrine seems to apply to any case in which
a plaintiff cannot identify the actual manufacturer of a generic product that caused that plaintiff's injury. 69 For example, the doctrine
may be applied in the more than 1,000 DES cases already being
litigated in the United States." Any number of similar drug suits could
be litigated on the basis of this doctrine.' Also, many of the nearly
63. Id.
64. Before the market share theory was established to lessen identification requirements,
DES victims in California had little hope of recovery if they could not identify which manufacturer caused their injuries, and they did not fit into any other established exceptions (discussed
supra note 32). See Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corporation, 395 F. Supp. 1081 (1975).
65. See, e.g., infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 314-29 (suggests discarding the market share
doctrine because of economic inefficiency and unfairness); Fischer, supra note 12, at 1627
(criticizes the market share theory for diluting the alternative liability doctrine to such an extent
that the goal of allocating responsibility according to each defendant's share of the fault is
not met, and for allowing courts and juries to decide cases without adequate evidence). Legislative
proposals have even been put forth to eliminate the market share doctrine. See, e.g., S.B.
228 Cal. Leg. 1981-82 Regular Session, (California senate bill proposed to eliminate liability
for latent defects unless manufacturer could be identified) (Died in committee, Jan. 19, 1982).
67. The following states have accepted at least modified versions of the market share theory:
Massachussetts, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); New Jersey, see Ferrigno
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Washington, see Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,
689 P.2d 368 (1984).
68. The following states have declined to adopt the market share theory: Missouri, see
Zafft v. Eli Lilly and Co., 676 S.W. 2d 241 (1984); South Carolina, see Ryan v. Eli Lilly,
514 F. Supp. 1004 (1981); Wisconsin, see Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W. 2d 37 (1984).
69. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 1652. The market share theory conceivably could apply
to all potentially harmful fungible products made from an identical formula. Id. Therefore
the theory could encompass the manufacturing and marketing of cigarettes, food additives,
generic drugs, asbestos, pesticides, aluminum wire, industrial waste, and products that cause
environmental pollution. Id. See also, Comment, supra note 4, at 303.
70. Rout, Product-Liability Law is in Flux as Attorneys Test a Radical Doctrine, Wall
St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 7.
71. Id. at 4, col. 4. For example, the market share theory has been applied in a case
involving injuries resulting from a diptheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT) vaccine. See Morris
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1983). But see, Sheffield v. Eli
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8,000 asbestos cases could be affected. 72 In fact, the market share
doctrine could feasibly be applied in suits against cigarette manufacturers. 73 These manufacturers have previously escaped liability because
of their assertions that smokers switch brands frequently and therefore
cannot prove that the smoker's cancer was caused by any one manufac-

turer.7" Theoretically at least, the Sindell doctrine may be used to
liability suits
lessen a plaintiffs' proof requirements in strict products
7

against a manufacturer of any generic product.

1

Because of the potentially widespread use of the market share doctrine, the issues left unresolved by the Sindell court must be con-

fronted. One vital question is whether the market share doctrine alters
the plaintiff's burden of proving causation before punitive damages

are awarded. Generally, punitive awards are granted only after a plaintiff establishes that the defendant's misconduct actually caused the

plaintiff's harm. Although the Sindell decision established that the
Lilly and Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983), in which plaintiff attempted
to recover under the market share theory after suffering injuries allegedly caused by Salk antipolio
vaccine. The court held that although the vaccine was produced by different manufacturers
pursuant to a common formula, the injuries resulted not from the use of a drug generally
defective when used for the purpose for which it was marketed, but because some manufacturer made and distributed a defective product. Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 192 Cal.
Rptr. at 876.
72. Thus far, however, no court has accepted the market share doctrine as applicable to
an asbestos case. Many courts have rejected the implementation of the doctrine in asbestos
litigation because of the difficulty in ascertaining market shares, difficulty in defining relevant
product and geographic market because of the numerous uses to which asbestos is put, and
because often the plaintiff is able to identify at least one of the defendants who caused the
alleged injury. See, e.g., Hannon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La.
1983); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard
Coast Line Railroad, 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531
F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Celotex v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
73. See supra note 70, at 4, col. 4. See also Note, Industrywide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 980, 1002 (1979).
74. Id.
75. See Comment, supra note 4, at 302-03. The market share theory is still a relatively
new phenomenon. Exactly what types of injurious products may give rise to the implementation of the market share doctrine remain to be seen. Thus far, plaintiffs have attempted to
utilize the market share theory in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (market share theory applicable to diptheria, pertussis
and tetanus (DPT) vaccine); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(market share theory inappropriate in asbestos litigation because of difficulty in ascertaining
market share, absence of large manufacturer, and plaintiff's ability to identify at least one
defendant); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963 (Pa. 1985) (market share
theory inappropriate where multipiece tire and rim was not 'generically similar' to others in
the industry, and plaintiff's inability to identify manufacturer was not due to any fault of
that manufacturer); Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 452 N.Y.S. 2d 299 (1982) (glass
beer bottle may be appropriate subject for market share theory, but summary judgment granted
because of insufficient pleading); Davis v. Yearwood, 612 S.W. 2d 917 (Tenn. 1980) (complaint dismissed because no specific allegations were made pertaining to which material from
padded cell caused the injury).
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burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants in compensatory claims, the court did not decide whether the burden shifts
in punitive damage claims.7" Plaintiffs generally will seek punitive
damages in market share products liability cases because of the outrage
associated with a manufacturer profiting from a product that injures
a member of the general public."
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Background

A.

The doctrine of punitive damages originated in the English com-

mon law and is an established principle in the common law of this
country.7 8 When California adopted the Civil Code in 1872, the doctrine was incorporated in section 3294.11 The current version of section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages when the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.80 "Malice" may
be established not only by a showing that the defendant's wrongful
conduct was willful or intentional, but also by a showing that defendant's conduct evinced a conscious disregard for the probability that
the conduct would result in injury to others. 8 '
Although modern courts appear less reluctant to award punitive
damages, 2 the rules governing the imposition of these damages re76.
77.
78.
1262-63
79.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supra note 20, at 185.
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
(1976).

REV.

1258,

The current version of CAL. Civ. CODE §3294 reads as follows:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.'
CAL. CIV. CODE

§3294.

80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Davies v. Superior Ct., 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322
(1980); Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895-96, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696, 598 P.2d
854, 856 (1979); Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 582 P.2d 980,
986, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395-96 (1978); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450,
465, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 425 (1974); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 240-41,
71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968).
82. See Comment, supra note 20, at 195. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d
174, 194, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 399 (1985) (punitive damages awarded when employee of brokerage
firm breached fiduciary duty to plaintiff); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d
757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981) (punitive damages awarded in products liability action
against manufacturer of defectively designed car); Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 894, 900,
598 P.2d 854, 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (1979) (punitive damages recoverable in personal
injury action brought against intoxicated driver); Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal.
3d 910, 922, 582 P. 2d 980, 986, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 (1978) (punitive damages awarded
for "bad faith" failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits).
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main strict. 8 3 A complaint for punitive damages must allege that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, either
expressly or impliedly. 8 Complaints alleging "opaque, unstable and
compound averments" are not sufficient.85 Proof requirements also
remain stringent.8" Adherence to traditional proof requirements for
punitive damages would create an insurmountable obstacle to an award
of punitive damages in a market share case.8 7 If a plaintiff were able
to prove which particular defendant caused the plaintiff's injury, then
that plaintiff would not be an appropriate market share plaintiff
anyway.88 The strict rules governing the punitive damages doctrine
aid in furthering the functions of that doctrine.
B.

Functions

Punitive damages serve a number of functions in society. The primary
functions are usually said to be punishment 9 and deterrence.90 Secondary
purposes include encouraging law enforcement 9' and further compensating plaintiffs whose actual damages exceed those allowed by law or
whose award will be depleted by attorneys' fees. 92 The punishment and
deterrence functions take on added importance in products liability suits
because of the complexity of modern technology and consumers' inability
to recognize the potential dangers of a product.93
83. See, e.g., Searle v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 27, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221
(1975). Plaintiff brought suit against two drug firms who manufactured and sold an oral contraceptive that injured plaintiff. Id. at 24-25, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 219. Plaintiff sought punitive
damages, claiming that defendants placed the product on the market with knowledge of its
hazards in complete disregard of the safety of others. Id. at 28, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The
Searle court held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show fraud, malice or oppression, and sustained defendant's demurrer. Id. at 33, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294.
85. Searle, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
86. See Comment, supra note 20, at 197.
87. See Comment, supra note 20, at 185-86. The inability of consumers to identify manufacturers of products who cause their injuries is an ever-increasing phenomenon. Unless these consumers are relieved of the burden of proving causation, punitive damage recovery becomes
literally impossible. Id. at 185-86.
88. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982). When a plaintiff does have information as to the identity of the defendant who allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury, the rationale for shifting the burden of proof in Sindell is simply not present. Id.
89. At least one commentator suggests that retribution is no longer a valid justification
in California. See Comment, supra note 20, at 193. A recent California case, however, stated
that "punitive damages are awarded against a defendant for the sake of example and by way
of punishing him." Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 197, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 400 (1985).
90. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1277; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §908 comment
a (1976).
91. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1278.
92. Id.
93. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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Punishment of a defendant who has intentionally or recklessly injured a plaintiff allows the plaintiff to see the defendant pay for the
misconduct.9" Additionally, this punishment serves the public function of maintaining the moral strength of society by punishing those
who violate societal norms. 95 Imposing punitive damages conveys the
commitment of society to upholding moral and legal standards by
expressing disapproval of serious misconduct. 96

Deterrence is also a fundamental goal of the punitive damages doctrine. Punitive damage awards against one defendant will generally
deter not only the particular defendant's further misconduct,97 but
also the conduct of others either engaged in or considering similar
tortious conduct. 98 Some manufacturers may be aware of the defects
in the products they are distributing, but, even allowing for the payment of compensatory claims, find more profit can be made by continuing to market the products in their dangerous form.9 9 Because
of the unpredictability of the amount of any given punitive damage
award, manufacturers cannot account for these awards when predicting the profitability of their products, and therefore the incentive
to engage in the lucrative misconduct is eliminated.
An ancillary function of the punitive damages doctrine is the promotion of law enforcement.' 0 Plaintiffs are motivated to bring suits
for punitive damages against wrongdoers because of the possibility
of recovering large awards. Many critics of the doctrine complain of
the windfall received by a plaintiff."0 ' The notion of this windfall,
94. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1279.
95. Id. at 1280.
96. Id. at 1281.
If law-breakers go unpunished, law-abiders consequently must pay a disproportionate
share in a system that purports to require reciprocal sacrifices from each citizen.
The punishment of offenders thus reinforces the confidence of the law-abider in the
basic fairness of the legal system and in the utility of his personal decision to obey
the law.
Id.
97. See Comment, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Froud v. Celotex,32 DEPAUL
L. REv. 457, 464-65 (1983); Owen, supra note 78, at 1283.
98. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1282.
99. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal, Rptr. 348
(1981). Defendant car manufacturer discovered after a series of crash tests that Pinto's fuel
tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mileper-hour collision. Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Ford, however, decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and
limbs against corporate profits. Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384. See also, Toole v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (defendant manufactured and
marketed triparanol, a drug that was supposed to aid in the treatment of arteriosclerosis, knowing
that the drug caused blindness, but marketing it as "remarkably free from side effects").
100. Owen, supra note 78, at 1278; Grimshaw 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
101. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, .(N.Y. 1961) (dissenting opinion);
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however, makes the prospect of potentially lengthy, traumatic, and

expensive litigation more appealing to hesitant victims." 2 The resulting
increase in the litigation of these pun.itive damage claims further deters
defendant misconduct.

Another incidental function of punitive damages is additional compensation of the victim.'0 3 Accident victims frequently suffer un-

compensable harm such as loss of emotional tranquility, family harmony, and employment security. 0

4

Punitive awards help to compen-

sate victims for these additional losses that generally are not accounted
for in compensatory awards.'0

5

Further, the payment of attorneys'

fees out of an award intended for medical and special expenses is
more burdensome on a plaintiff than the payment of a portion of
a punitive award.

0

6

All of these functions of the punitive damage

doctrine will generally be reflected in a jury's measurement of an appropriate award.
C. Measurement
A jury is not bound by any fixed ratio in determining the propor-

tion between punitive and compensatory damages.'0 7 A punitive damage
award, however, must generally bear a reasonable relationship to the

actual damage.'

8

Several factors may be considered- for measuring

punitive damage awards.10 9 One proposed consideration is the reprehenKink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965). Some commentators even propose that
punitive damage awards should go to the state. Hodgkin & Veitch, Punitive Damages-Reassessed,
21 INTL. & CoMP. L. Q. 119, 132 (1972).
102. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1287.
103. Id. at 1295-96; Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
104. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1298. Some courts refuse to recognize punitive damages
as a form of compensation since the whole idea behind compensatory damages is to "make
the plaintiff whole again". See, e.g., U.S. v. Magnolia Motor and Lodging Co., 208 F. Supp.
63, 66 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
105. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1298-99.
106. Id.
107. See Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (punitive damage awards
not limited by state and federal statutes imposing maximum penalties).
108. See Zhadan v. Downtown L.A., 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 496, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140
(1976). But see Comment, supra note 97, at 468. "Reasonable relationship" test has been subjected to severe criticism as "artificial and meaningless". Id.
109. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act lists a number of factors that a jury should
consider in determining an appropriate amount of punitive damages. These considerations include:
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm would arise from the product seller's misconduct;
(2) The degree of the product seller's awareness of that likelihood;
(3) The profitability of the misconduct to the product seller;
(4) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it by the product seller;
(5) The attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery of the misconduct and whether the conduct has been terminated;
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sibility of the defendant's conduct.' 10 Juries will instinctively attach
a degree of culpability to a defendant's misconduct based upon the
likelihood of the harm and the extent to which the manufacturer was
aware of the threatened harm."' An additional factor juries may be
instructed to consider is the amount of punishment the defendant has
been subjected to thus far, and may be subjected to in the future." 2
This may be difficult because a jury cannot predict the amount of
punitive damages that the manufacturer may be subjected to in the
future in their own or in other states, nor can the jury predict the
amount to be assessed in suits by plaintiffs who have suffered varying injuries." 3 Another consideration is the wealth of the defendant.'
The amount assessed should serve as a deterrent by hurting, but not
bankrupting, the defendant." ' Another useful guideline is theocost
of the plaintiff's litigation. ' 6 Finally, the jury may consider the profitability of the conduct to the defendant and the degree of risk posed
to the consumer.' '7
Before Sindell, a plaintiff who was unable to identify the specific
tortfeasor that caused the plaintiff's harm could not recover compensatory damages using traditional tort doctrines."'

Sindell lessened

(6) The financial condition of the product seller;
(7) The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be imposed upon the
product seller as a result of the misconduct, including punitive damage awards to
persons similarly situated to the claimant and the severity of criminal penalties to
which the product seller has been or may be subjected; and
(8) Whether the harm suffered by the claimant was also the result of the claimant's
own reckless disregard for personal safety.
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT

§120(B) (1983).

110. See Orimshaw 119 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388; Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 920, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978).
111. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturersof Defective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 46 (1982).

112.

See

MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT

§120(B)(8) (1983).

113. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (court
expressed difficulty in seeing what even the most intelligent jury would do with this because
of the jury's inherent inability to know what punitive damages, if any, juries in other states
may award plaintiffs in actions yet untried).
114. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (C.D. Cal. 1983); In
re No. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Grimshaw 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
115. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
"Dalkon Shiel", 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at
757, 174 Cal Rptr. at 348.
116. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1315; Comment, supra note 97, at 467.
117. See, Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 790, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
118. Plaintiffs could, however, utilize some of the exceptions to traditional proof requirements
outlined supra at note 32. Since Sindell, however, additional doctrines have been created in
various states to lessen the causation requirements for plaintiffs who cannot identify the manufacturer that produced the good that caused the plaintiff's harm. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wa. 1984) (market share alternate liability theory); Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 342 N.W. 2d 37 (Wis. 1984) (concerted action theory).
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causation requirements for particular plaintiffs who are unable to prove
which defendants caused their injuries by shifting the burden of proof

to the defendants." 9 The Sindell decision, however, did not discuss
whether the burden shifts to the defendants to disprove causation in
claims for punitive damages. Two courts in California have recently
interpreted this open question, but each reached a different result. 20
One approach concluded that in keeping with the spirit of Sindell,
2

punitive damages may be imposed on a market share defendant.' '
The other held that punitive damages are inappropriate in market share
cases. 122
MORRIS V. PARKE,

DAvIs, & Co.

In Morris v Parke, Davis, & Co., 23 the United States District Court
for the Central District of California held that punitive damages could
be awarded in a market share case.' 24 The plaintiff, David Morris,
suffered irreparable brain damage when he was six months old as
a result of a reaction to a diptheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT) vaccine.' 25 A tort action was brought on his behalf against five pharmaceutical companies who manufactured a substantial share of the
DPT market at the time of David Morris' injury. ' 26 Plaintiffs conceded they were unable to identify which manufacturer produced the
vaccine that harmed David Morris.1 27 Instead they relied on Sindell
and the market share theory of recovery.' 28 On defendants' motion
to strike a prayer for punitive damages, the court held that if plaintiffs were able to establish that their injuries were caused by DPT,
and that one or more of the defendants marketed the drug with conscious disregard for the health of consumers, plaintiffs could recover
from each defendant who acted with the requisite
punitive damages
29
"malice."

The Morris court was not deterred by the question of causation,
stating that the purpose of Sindell was to modify the rules of causa119. Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 145, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
120. Compare Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (federal
district court), with Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1985) (California appellate court).
121. See Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1330.
122. See Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
123. 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (a diversity case applying California law).
124. Id. at 1330.
125. Id. at 1324.
126. Id. at 1324-25.
127. Id.at 1325.
128* Id.
129. Id. at 1330.
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tion so tortfeasors who might otherwise escape liability could be
brought within the reach of the law. 30 Manufacturers who act with
conscious disregard for consumer safety should not be permitted to
escape punitive damages simply because the nature of their activity
precludes identification of which defendant is responsible for the
resulting harm.'3 ' The Morris court also drew an admittedly imperfect
analogy to the respondeat superiortheory, which holds employers liable
for intentional torts of their employees.' 32 The court conceded that
the analogy was flawed because in an agency situation, the plaintiff
can identify the employee, who may be traced to a particular
employer.' 33 The district court, however, was "unable to draw any
meaningful distinction between the culpability of a reckless employer
and that of a reckless manufacturer. Both have acted with conscious
disregard of the rights of others.""'3 This employer/manufacturer
analogy was used by the Morris court to reject defendants' arguments
that punitive damages can not be recovered absent a showing that
defendant personally participated in the injurious conduct.'"
Furthermore, the Morris court was undeterred by the problems of
computing and allocating punitive damages, stating that mechanical
36
problems could hardly outweigh the need to protect public safety.
The opinion also noted the disparity between the purposes behind
compensatory damages and those behind punitive damages.'" Since
the purposes of punitive damages are primarily punishment and deterrence, the focus is on the defendant when determining what award
amount would serve to punish and deter that party.'38 Therefore,
punitive damages would not be apportioned according to market share,
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1328.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. This is relevant because the apparent basis of the Magallanes rejection of Morris
was that the Magallanes court viewed "the employer-employee-victim connection warranting
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to be substantially different than the

manufacturer-unidentifiable drug-victim connection in Sindell." Magallanes v. Superior Ct.,
167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552 (1985). Immediately following the distinction between employers and manufacturers, the Magallanes court stated, "Consequently, we
are not persuaded by the reasoning of Morris." Id. Not only did the Magallanes court neglect
to give reasons for rejecting the view, the decision also implied that the decision in Morris
was based upon the employer/manufacturer analogy. The Morris conclusion was not based

upon that analogy, but was based upon valid policy considerations. See supra notes 123-134
and infra notes 136-145 and accompanying text.
136. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1328.
137. Id. at 1329.
138. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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but rather each defendant would be assessed and pay as though the
sole defendant.' 3 9
The decision in Morris emphasized that concern for the public safety
was the very basis upon which Sindell was founded, and that courts
should be reluctant to adopt rules that would compromise this "paramount concern."'' 0 The opinion went on to convey the fear that in
a commercial context, the threat of compensatory damages may not
serve as a deterrent to reckless conduct.'4 Manufacturers could find
that maintaining a product in a dangerous condition is more profitable than improving the product, and then would
adjust prices to
4 2
allow for the payment of compensatory claims.'
In Morris, the court concluded that neither government safety standards nor the criminal law have succeeded in providing adequate consumer protection against the manufacture and sale of defective products.' 3 Therefore, punitive damages remain the most effective means
of protecting the consumer against defective, mass-produced articles.'
The Magallanes decision did not address this final conclusion reached
in Morris, but rejected for other1 reasons the imposition of punitive
damages in market share cases. 41
MAGALLANES V. SUPERIOR COURT

In Magallanes v. Superior Court,'4 6 the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that punitive damages could not
be imposed on a defendant in a market share case.' 7 In this case,
plaintiff Patricia Magallanes brought suit under the Sindell market
share theory because she suffered from cancer as a result of her
mother's ingestion of DES while plaintiff was in utero. '4 As was the
case in Morris, the plaintiff could not identify which manufacturer
produced the drug that caused the injury.'4 9 The Magallanes court
rejected the Morris reasoning for imposing punitive damages as unpersuasive, apparently on the grounds that the court did not find the
employer-employee-victim connection mentioned in Morris to be
similar to the manufacturer-unidentifiable drug-victim nexus.," The
139. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
140. Id.at 1327.
141.

Id.

142.

Id. See, e.g., Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348.

143. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1327.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1985).
Id. at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
Id. at 880-81, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
Id. at 881, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
Id. at 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 552. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

1461

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17

Magallanes opinion then recited five policy reasons why punitive
damages should not be imposed in market share cases. These reasons
included the punitive effect of numerous and substantial compensatory
awards to present and future claimants,' the attenuated deterrent
effect of long belated awards,' 5 2 the inherent unfairness of punitive
damages in the market share context,' 3 the preservation of rights of
future claimants to compensatory damages, 54 and the potential for
bankrupting the company.'5
These differing decisions reflect the uncertainty with which courts
in California view the issue of whether punitive damages may be imposed in market share cases. Clearly, a resolution must be reached
to avoid further inconsistent decisions. Initially, the policy considerations of each approach should be analyzed to determine whether
California public policy warrants the imposition of punitive damages
in actions brought under the market share theory of liability.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

At the very heart of Sindell is the idea that the manufacturer is
in a position to guard against product dangers and must have incentive to protect consumers from those hazards.' 6 Imposition of punitive
damage liability in the market share context promotes this reasoning
in Sindell by providing added incentive for manufacturers to act in
a manner that assures the public safety.'15 Additionally, the manufacturer should not escape liability just because the plaintiff cannot identify whether manufacturer A or manufacturer B, each of whom produce an identical product, manufactured the particular object that
58
caused the plaintiff's injury.'
The Morris court focused on the purposes behind punitive damages
and the importance of the doctrine in society today.' 9 If the plain151. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See infra notes 161-168
and accompanying text.
152. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See infra notes 169-72
and accompanying text.
153. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See infra notes 173-76
and accompanying text.
154. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See infra notes 177-79
and accompanying text.
155. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See infra notes 177-79
and accompanying text.
156. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Indeed, this
idea forms much of the basis of the strict products liability doctrine. See Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439.
157. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1325.
158. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
159. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1327.

1462

1986 / Sindell and Beyond
tiff is able to prove malice, oppression, or fraud on the part of any
one or more defendants, then the goals of deterring wrongful conduct and punishing wrongdoers will be served by the imposition of
punitive liability on the defendant even if the plaintiff cannot prove
that the particular defendant's misconduct caused the particular injury.' 60 The Magallanes decision, on the other hand, may have been
based on superficial reasoning. The policy reasons promoted by that
-decision are not consistent with the reasoning of the California Supreme
Court in Sindell and may not adequately respond to the situation posed
by this issue. One reason given by the Magallanes court to justify
the denial of punitive damages was that numerous and substantial
compensatory awards to present and future claimants would have a
sufficiently punitive effect on manufacturers.' 6' This idea is superficially appealing, but probably invalid. The effectiveness of the
punitive damages doctrine in the area of products liability lies in the
flexibility given a jury to assess an amount that is appropriate and
responsive to a particular situation.' 6 2 The number and amount of3
compensatory claims can be reasonably predicted by a manufacturer.'
Manufacturers might maintain the dangerous condition of a product
if they would profit by doing so, even in light of having to pay compensatory awards to victims.' 6 Because of the unpredictability of the
amount of punitive awards, however, manufacturers may not be able
to measure punitive liability in advance. Subjecting manufacturers to
compensatory liability only, even "numerous and substantial" compensatory awards, may not have a punitive effect on the defendants.
In addition, liability insurance will cover manufacturers for the payment of most, if not all, compensatory claims.' 65 If a manufacturer
has liability insurance, then regardless of the "substantiality" of compensatory claims against the company, that manufacturer will not feel
160. Morris, 573 F. Supp. at 1328.
161. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
162. For example, drug manufacturers may estimate potential compensatory liability based
on their knowledge of the defects and the number of consumers to which their products may
be distributed. The estimation, however, could not be precise if the defendants were to be
compelled to pay punitive damages in addition to the compensatory damages.
163. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1294-95. In contrast, the method of measurement for
punitive damages introduces additional unpredictable factors that render a manufacturer's attempt
to forecast potential punitive liability virtually impossible. Thus, depending on such factors
as the gravity of the misconduct, the number and seriousness of resulting injuries, and the
manufacturer's wealth, the possible punitive damage awards that could be imposed for the
misconduct could range from nothing to millions, or hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. at 1285.
164. See, e.g., Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
165. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 70 (1982).
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the sting of having to pay the awards.' 66 Of course, in states that
allow insurance coverage of punitive damage claims, the imposition

of punitive damages would have little additional deterrent effect.' 6678
California, however, prohibits such coverage as against public policy.'
In California, and in other states that prohibit punitive damage insurance coverage, the imposition of punitive damages will have a
significant deterrent effect.
Another policy reason which the Magallanes court used to justify
the rejection of punitive damages in market share cases was the attenuated deterrent effect of long belated awards.' 69 The court stated
that the objective of deterrence is hardly relevant when the defective

goods have already been removed from the marketplace.' 70 This is
an inaccurate appraisal of the function of deterrence in the punitive
damages context. Society may have no interest in deterring the
manufacture of the product in question because that particular good
would presumably be off the market by the time a suit arose.'7" The
interest of society is in deterring similar future misconduct. Manufacturers must understand
that disregard of the safety of society will
72

not be tolerated.
The inherent unfairness of imposing punitive damages in the market
share scheme was another policy reason upon which the Magallanes
decision was based. ' 7 The court declared that the imposition of
punitive damages on a defendant based solely on his market participation would be "grossly unfair."' 74 Some manufacturers who acted

166. The manufacturer, however, may have to pay the amount of compensatory claims
that exceeds the company's insurance limits.
167. Twenty-two states allow insurance coverage againA punitive damages judgments:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Distict of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Eight states prohibit such coverage on the grounds that the purposes of punitive damages would be defeated
by the ability to insure against them: California, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, New
York, North Dakota, and Ohio. The issue has yet to be decided in nine jurisdictions: Alaska,
Hawaii, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
And seven jurisdictions have not decided the issue because of their non-recognition of punitive
damages: Louisiana, Massachussetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and Washington.
The remaining six states allow insurance of punitive damages only in cases of vicarious liability:
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Schumaier and McKinsey,
The Insurabilityof Punitive Damages,72 A.B.A.J. 68 (March 1, 1986).
168. See Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 379, 172 Cal. Rptr.
59, 62 (1981).
169. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
170. Id.
171. If the product has not been taken off the market, then presumably at least the defect
will have been eliminated.
172. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1282.
173. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
174. Id.
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with malice, and may even have produced the object which caused
the harm, may not be named in the suit and will thereby fortuitously

escape punitive liability; whereas some manufacturers who acted with
malice but have caused no actual harm to the plaintiff may be subjected to punitive damages.'" The unfairness of this situation is
dubious. Society has an interest in deterring further misconduct by
punishing all the wrongdoers who can be proven to have actually acted
in a manner that intentionally created serious risks to the public
safety.'1 6 Some "malicious" wrongdoers will inevitably escape punitive
liability since proving a case for punitive damages is so difficult. But
this is no reason to allow proven wrongdoers to escape unpunished.
Manufacturers of generic products would have little incentive to refrain
from intentionally producing hazardous products if they knew they
could not be held liable for punitive damage awards.
The final reason given by the Magallanes court for not allowing
punitive damages in market share litigation was the preservation of
rights of future claimants and the potential for bankrupting defendants.' 7 7 While possibly a substantial concern in theory, the concern
for future claimants may in reality be unfounded. Actual mass tort
litigation has not resulted in widespread bankruptcy of defendant
manufacturers.' 8 Nevertheless, the threat of bankrupting a socially
175. Id.
176. Punitive damages serve the functions of criminal sanctions within the civil context.
Both are penal, and intended to deter others from the commission of similar acts. See Owen,
supra note 78, at 1277 n.103. Punitive damages are allowed because our legal system recognizes
that the deterrence function can better be achieved through modification of civil awards than
through the requirement of criminal sanctions. See Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 738 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
Because of the penal nature of punitive damages, an analogy may be drawn between the
punitive damages doctrine and the criminal law. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 1630. Although one
is never punished for "evil thoughts" alone, one may be punished for evil conduct even if
that conduct never results in the intended harm. Id. Examples of this concept can be seen
in the criminal punishment of persons for attempted murder or reckless driving. Id. These
crimes may cause no injury to individuals, but society will punish the wrongdoers for their
"malicious" conduct. Similarly, whether the civil defendant in the courtroom caused the plaintiff's injury or not, by virtue of that defendant's having acted with the requisite malice, society
has a strong interest in punishing the defendant for the conduct that jeopardized the public
safety, and in deterring further similar misconduct.
This analogy is imperfect because when society punishes wrongdoers in the criminal context,
money is not awarded to plaintiffs who may have been injured by this "malicious" conduct.
As in criminal law, however, the focus in the punitive damages doctrine is on the defendant
and not the victim. The fact that a victim may receive a windfall is not enough to preclude
the imposition of punitive damages upon a defendant who acted with malice.
177. Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
178. See Comment, supra note 97, at 469. A review of the litigation surrounding the MER/29
litigation, a fully litigated mass torwsituation which seemed to threaten the solvency of the
defendant, suggests that this fear of overkill may be overstated. Only eleven of-nearly one
thousand MER/29 cases went to a jury. Of these, four verdicts were for the defendant, and
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beneficial manufacturer may be a concern that needs to be taken into account when considering whether some limitation on the amount
of punitive damages to be assessed is warranted. The risk of bankrupting defendants that provide socially desirable services and products may be the one concern of the Magallanes court that has some
merit. This concern, however, is not substantial enough to preclude
the imposition of punitive liability on manufacturers in a market share
situation since the risk of bankruptcy could be reduced substantially
through procedures that limit the amount of punitive damages which
could be awarded.' 79
In addition to the concerns expressed by the Magallanes court, some
commentators contend that the imposition of punitive damages in
market share cases should not be allowed' 80 because that implementation, at least in the field of drug manufacture, may inhibit pharmaceutical research and development, thereby precluding the strong
societal interest in medical advances.'"' Punitive damages, however,
are only allowed when a plaintiff proves malice, oppression or fraud
on the part of the defendant. Manufacturers who adequately, or even
negligently, test their products will not be subjected to punitive damages
unless they act with intent to injure or in conscious disregard of the
public safety. 8" The interest of society in medical progress is not so
strong that we should encourage drug manufacturers to put new drugs
on the market regardless of the potential risk. Furthermore, not allowing punitive damages in drug cases could have the dangerous effect
seven were for the plaintiffs. Only three juries awarded punitive damages. One of the awards

was reversed on appeal, and the other two were upheld as reduced on remittitur by the trial
judge. Thus, the total amount in punitive damages imposed against the defendant Richardson-

Merrell was $1 million. The company had a reserve of $42 million from surplus earnings. Defendants paid $1 million in punitive damages, and $6 million in compensatory damages that exceeded
their insurance limits-S7 million in all. Id. For a comprehensive reading of the MER/29 litigation, see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 116 (1968).
179. This comment will propose a suggested means of limiting the damages to achieve the

purposes of the punitive damages doctrine without bankrupting the defendant. See infra notes
185-236 and accompanying text.
180. See Comment, supra note 20, at 207-08.
181. Id. at 207 n.10.
The social and economic benefits from the mobilizing of the industry's resources

in the war against disease and in reducing the costs of medical care are potentially
enormous.... The potential gains from further advances remain large. To risk such

gains is unwise. Our major objective should be to encourage a continued high level
industry investment in pharmaceutical research and development.
SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH: SOURCES OF NEW
DRUGS AND THE PROFITABILITY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 54 (1975). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment k (1965).
182. CAL. CIr. CODE §3294.

1466

1986 / Sindell and Beyond

of encouraging manufacturers to avoid testing new drugs adequately
before placing them on the market. If manufacturers, through comprehensive testing, discover some health risk posed by a new drug,
then they are faced with the difficult choice of either putting the
dangerous drug on the market anyway, and risking possible liability,
or not marketing the drug, and losing all of the research and development costs already incurred. Some manufacturers may prefer to risk
potential products liability claims if no punitive damages are involved
'
rather than write off the costs of developing a new drug. 83
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, most of the objections raised by the Magallanes court and some commentators to imposing punitive liability in market share cases can be refuted. The
one concern raised by the Magallanes decision that may retain some
merit is that numerous punitive damage awards may bankrupt the
defendant and therefore leave later plaintiffs uncompensated.,"
Although public policy and the reasoning of Sindell warrant the imposition of punitive damages in market share cases, a workable and
just procedure for their distribution must be implemented to avoid
potentially counterproductive consequences.
SUGGESTED PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR THE

AWARD OF PUNITIvE DAMAGES IN MARKET SHARE CASES
Once the determination has been made that California public policy
and the rationale behind the market share doctrine in Sindell warrant
the imposition of punitive damages in market share cases, courts should
have the flexibility to distribute the awards in a manner suitable to
the circumstances of each particular case. Depending on the nature
of the product that caused the injury, and more importantly, the nature
of the resulting injuries, suits could arise that mandate different means
of determining punitive awards. This comment suggests one feasible
approach to controlling the award of punitive damages in market share
liability cases.' 85

183. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967).
184. See Magallanes, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 552; Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1966), reh'g denied (May 8, 1967); Comment, supra note
20, at 203-07.
185. See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.
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A.

Proof Requirements

Courts imposing punitive damages in market share cases should retain the high proof requirements that are now required of any plaintiff proving a case for punitive damages. With the exception of proving
causation, no reason exists why traditional punitive damage proof requirements should be lessened in a market share case. Therefore, a
plaintiff should be required to prove that:
(I) Plaintiff was injured by a generic object,'" (2) Defendant
manufactured and sold identical products in the time and space that
plaintiff acquired the good,' 87 and (3) Manufacturer acted with intent to injure or a conscious disregard for the public safety.' 88
In the event the plaintiff proves these elements against a manufacturer by a preponderance' 89 of the evidence, that manufacturer must
then rebut the claim by showing that it could not have manufactured
the product which injured the plaintiff. If the manufacturer can not
rebut the claim, then the plaintiff is entitled to a punitive damage
award to be assessed in terms of the extent of the misconduct.
B. Assessment Of Punitive Damages
Once malice has been established, the judge must instruct the jury
on what to consider in determining the amount the defendant must
pay in punitive damages.' 90 In a market share situation, the jury should
be instructed to determine an amount that would sufficiently punish
the defendant and deter further misconduct by this defendant and
others. Since a defendant's liability is based on share in the market
and not necessarily involvement in any particular injury, the jury
should know what the manufacturer's share of the market was in
186.
187.

See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P. 2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Id.

188. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294.
189. Some suggest that the standard of proof for punitive damages in products liability
actions should be "clear and convincing". The Model Uniform Product Liability Act states:
Punitive damages may be awarded to the claimant if the claimant proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller's
reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers, or others who might
be harmed by the product.
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §120(A) (1983).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §908 comment d (1965). Some commentators
suggest that allowing the judge to measure the amount of a punitive award after the jury has
determined punitive damages should be imposed would also be an appropriate means of limiting
excessive awards. See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §120(B) (1983); Owen, supra note 78, at 1320; Dubois, Punitive Damages
in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional MalpracticeCases: Bonanza or Disaster,
43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 352-53 (1976).
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light of the reprehensibility of the conduct. The factors to be considered include the degree of risk taken, the seriousness of the potential effects, and the number of people who may have been affected.
For example, if the defendant represented seventy percent of a market
and knew the product could cause skin inflammation but did not warn,
then the reprehensibility of that manufacturer is probably less than
that of a manufacturer who represents two percent of the market but
knows the product may be life threatening. '9
The wealth of the defendant should certainly be considered in the
determination of the punitive award to promote the goals of punishment and deterrence.' 9 2 The best way to accomplish these goals in
a commercial context is to force a manufacturer to pay a large enough
amount that the company feels an economic burden.1 93 As previously
stated, the judge has control over the amount of punitive damages
awarded.' 94 Both the trial judge and the appellate judge may attempt
to reduce excessive awards by requiring the plaintiff to choose between remitting the excessive portion of the verdict or submitting to
95
a new trial on the damages issue.
In traditional tort litigation, the function of the court ends after
the jury determines an appropriate punitive amount and the defendant pays. A unique problem arises, however, in litigation involving
injuries to large numbers of plaintiffs arising from one product.' 9 6
The imposition of punitive damages in this type of mass tort litigation may require limitations to protect defendants from unlimited
liability and bankruptcy.

191. See, e.g., Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The defendant
in Grimshaw, Ford Motor Company, saved four to eight dollars per car in not improving
what it knew was a defective fuel system design. Id. at 790, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 370. Ford knew
that the Pinto was a popular economy car, and distributed it widely. Id. at 776, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 361. Evidence exists that Ford estimated its potential compensatory liability, and since
this amount was less than the amount of correcting the defects, Ford continued to distribute
the cars in the defective condition. Id. at 790, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
192. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348; Morris v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (C.D. Cal. 1983); In re Northern District of California
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Products, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981). See supra notes
114-116 and accompanying text (punitive award should be significant enough to burden wealthy
defendants).
193. Dalkon Shield, 526 F.Supp. at 899 (purpose of punitive damages is to sting, not to
kill, a defendant, and their imposition should not be permitted to bankrupt a defendant).
194. See, e.g., Caspersen v. Webber, 213 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1973) "Even in the absence
of passion or prejudice, the trial court should not hesitate to adjust a verdict where it is felt
that the evidence does not justify the amount." Id. at 331.
195. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1321.
196. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. N.Y. 1980).
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C. Distribution Of Punitive Damage Awards

In any mass tort situation, the imposition of punitive awards could
threaten the financial security of the defendant.' 9' Although one societal
goal of punitive damages is to "teach the manufacturers a lesson"' 98
for intentionally causing injuries, society is not benefitted by putting
manufacturers out of business.' 9 9 Not only would bankrupting these
manufacturers deprive society of potentially desirable products and
services, but also the bankruptcy would preclude recovery by later
plaintiffs. Therefore, special limitations must be placed on the distribution of punitive awards among injured plaintiffs in mass tort situations. 00 Several approaches to limiting liability have been suggested
in other mass tort litigation."' One procedural solution includes the
certification of a class action for the punitive damages aspect of the
claim only. 02 This approach would allow plaintiffs to separately try
their claims for compensatory damages. 03 Those plaintiffs who prove
their injuries were caused by the manufacturers' misconduct would

then be joined in a class action to determine appropriateness and
amount of punitive damages. 0 This solution would logically seem
to limit the amount of liability to which a manufacturer could be

197. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1325; Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill,
HASTINGS L.J. 1797 passim (1979).
198. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1322-25; Comment, supra note 97, at 470.
199. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1322-25; Comment, supra note 97, at 470.
200. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1322-25; Comment, supra note 97, at 470.
201. See infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text. Some have even proposed that criminal
sanctions be imposed upon manufacturers of defective products in lieu of punitive damages.
See, e.g., Indiana v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 slip op. (Elkhart Superior Ct. Feb. 2, 1979)
(Ford indicted on three counts of reckless homicide when passengers in a Pinto were killed
as a result of a known defective fuel system).
202. Courts vary in their decisions on whether to allow certification of a class for mass
liability purposes. See, e.g.. In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897- 98 (N.D. Cal. 1981) The district court in
California held that class certification was appropriate for purposes of assessing punitive damages,
while plaintiffs would try their compensatory claims separately. Id. Those who were successsful
in their claims for compensatory awards, could join the class to determine propriety of the
punitive damage award. Id. But see In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Products Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1982) (class decertified because
of problems with commonality and typicality). For other cases in which plaintiffs have sought
class certification, see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (Kansas
City Hyatt skywalk collapse); Snyder v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153
(1980) (Love Canal toxic waste action); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979)
(DES case). Certification was granted on a conditional basis in two cases: In re Agent Orange
Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. N.Y. 1980) (under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)),
and Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (DES action under FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3)).
203. See Comment, supra note 97 at 473.
204. Id.
30
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subjected. There are, however, numerous problems with this ap-

proach."' Problems include unique issues outnumbering common
issues,

jurisdictional problems,2"' slowing the settlement process,' 8

and determining when the class would close.20 9
Another proposed solution suggests limiting each plaintiffs recovery
to twice the plaintiff's compensatory damages or $1 million, whichever

is less. 21 This solution, however, is clearly inappropriate when the
defendants are manufacturers, because the manufacturers could simply
double their estimated compensatory liability or compute $1 million
as the amount of their potential liability in advance, and adjust their
pricing schemes accordingly.
Another approach establishes a ceiling on the amount a defendant
may be liable for in injuries arising out of a single product, and only
requires the payment of punitive claims until the till is peaked.21 ' Once
the "ceiling" is reached, punitive damages may be limited to attorneys'

fees and costs of litigation, or totally prohibited.21

Some commen-

tators have criticized this "ceiling" approach.21 3 One criticism is that

the established limit may not be high enough to have an impact on
some manufacturers. 2 1 Another problem is that the goal of deter205. Id. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability
Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir. 1982); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Comment, supra
note 97, at 474.
206. See In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" Products Liability Litigation, 693 F. 2d at 853; Comment, supra note 97, at 474. For example, there is frequently
no one set of operative facts establishing liability and no single proximate cause. Id. Additionally, such issues as adequacy of warnings, or fraud or conspiracy, may be different in
each individual case. Id.
207. Id. When plaintiffs opt out or are forced out of the class for jurisdictional reasons,
they should not be allowed to recover punitive damages on their own. If they could recover
individually, the purpose of creating the class, i.e., reducing the number of suits and awards,
would be defeated. Id.
208. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1982); Comment, supra note 97, at 474. The settlement process will slow when a class is certified for
the punitive damages issue because plaintiffs will be unable to release their individual punitive
damage claims, and defendants may not be willing to settle only the compensatory damage
claims. Id.
209. See Comment, supra note 97, at 474. A class can not fairly close until all potential
plaintiffs are identified. Many of the products involved in mass tort litigation, however, are
on the market for a long period of time, and injuries resulting from the use of these products
may not become evident until a long time after the product has been removed from the
marketplace. Id. Asbestos is a good example of this type of product. No one yet knows how
many future generations will be affected by exposure to asbestos products that have since been
removed from the market. Id. at 474 n.110.
210. See H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., Ist Session (1981); Comment, supra note 97, at 472.
211. See Owen, supra note 111, at 49 n.227.
212. Id. See also Comment, supra note 97, at 473-74.
213. See Comment, supra note 97, at 473; Note, supra note 197, at 1804-05.
214. See Comment, supra note 97, at 473; Note, supra note 197, at 1804-05.
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rence would be inhibited since companies who know how much could
be awarded against them could adjust their pricing schemes to reflect
this knowledge." 5 The final criticism of this approach is that the means
are inflexible - juries could not determine how much punishment
is required based on the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
in each particular case.21 ,
With a few adjustments, however, a ceiling placed on punitive
damages in market share cases could be an ideal means of limiting
defendants' punitive expenditures so as not to bankrupt the companies
while still accomplishing the goals of punitive damages. The first
necessary adjustment is to establish a limit that is substantial enough
to hurt large manufacturers, but not high enough to bankrupt smaller
concerns."17 Obviously, this will require different ceiling amounts for
different manufacturers. A solution may be to separate the trial on
the issue of punitive liability from the trial determining the appropriate
amount of punitive damages." 8 The amount deemed appropriate at
this latter trial would be the amount this defendant would be compelled to pay for all conduct relating to the injurious product regardless
of the number of plaintiffs to later sue."t ' Under the proposed solution, once a plaintiff establishes that a defendant acted with malice,
oppression, or fraud, punitive liability would be established. Then
the jury who heard the liability case, or a new jury impaneled for
the limited purpose of determining the amount of the punitive award,
could determine an appropriate amount of liability.220 The jury should
be instructed, however, that the award they determine will serve as
215.

See, e.g., Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348; Comment, supra

note 97, at 473.
216.

See Comment, supra note 97, at 473.

217.

If, for example, a $1 million limit was set for all mass tort punitive damage claims,

then a company with $50 million in surplus assets may not feel punished by being compelled

to pay this amount. Likewise, a small manufacturer may be rendered insolvent as a result
of the payment of a $1 million punitive damage award.
218.

A separate jury may be impaneled solely for the purpose of assessing an appropriate

amount of punitive damages based upon the defendant's conduct with respect to the product
at hand. On the other hand, this award-measuring jury could be the same one who found

the defendant liable for punitive damages against the first plaintiff. This latter solution may
be more efficient for the court system since the jury will have heard all the evidence at the
trial on liability. See Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., No. 85-2815 (U.S. Ct. of App. 5th
Cir. February 5, 1986) (available March 20, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). "While
no plaintiff may receive an award of punitive damages without proving that he suffered actual

damages, ... the allocation need not be made concurrently with an evaluation of the defendant's conduct. The relative timing of these assessments is not critical." Id.
219. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
220. The determination would be based upon the judge's instructions relating to measurement (see supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text), and would be subject to the traditional
controls of the trial judge in that jurisdiction. See Note, supra note 197, at 1800-01.
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the complete punishment of the defendant for all misconduct relating
to this product. 22' In this manner, the defendant will not be subjected
to repeated punitive awards for the same misconduct.
The determination of a variable ceiling amount would prevent
manufacturers from accounting for punitive damage awards in their
cost of doing business. 222 Since the punitive liability of each manufacturer will depend on its own wealth and reprehensibility as determined
at the time of the trial, the manufacturer will not be able to predict
whether a jury will impose punitive damages based, for example, on
two percent or ten percent of the company's surplus earnings. 22 3 This
flexible means of assessing punitive damages based on the misconduct of each defendant clearly would be more effective in punishing
and deterring these defendants than the implementation of a system
requiring the payment of a set ceiling or percentage of the company's
assets. Once this ceiling amount for punitive damages is established
by the jury, the defendant should be compelled to pay the entire
amount into a fund established by the court. Any later plaintiffs who
establish the elements necessary 224 for an award of punitive damages
against this defendant will receive their award from the fund. 22 5 The
punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages could be
221. The amount assessed would be distinct from any amount awarded to an individual
plaintiff. If the jury determining an amount is a separate entity comprised for the sole purpose
of determining amount, then the fact that this award is separate should be obvious. However,
if the jury who determined the validity of the punitive damage claim is also charged with determining an amount, then they may not be clear on this distinction.
222. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
223. Id. If a straight percentage or dollar amount were set, then certainly the manufacturer
could allow for possible punitive awards and reflect this cost in the price of the product. However,
allowing juries to determine an appropriate amount at the time of the trial should preclude
the producer's speculation. See Comment, supra note 97, at 473.
224. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. Since initial plaintiffs will have already
proven this defendant's share of the market and that the defendant acted with malice, the
later plaintiffs may only be required to prove that their injuries were caused by the generic object.
225. The establishment of this fund will obviously require the cooperation of all jurisdictions who implement the market share theory. Since a California court will be unable to control the award of punitive damages granted in a Washington court, plaintiffs who know the
ceiling has been reached in the fund of a certain manufacturer in California, may take their
suits to Washington. This forum-shopping would defeat the purpose of the fund. Plaintiffs
would be enabled to recover multiple punitive awards against one manufacturer, albeit recovering judgments in different states. State A may not be willing to recognize the award granted
in State B because of every state's interest in the welfare and benefits of its own citizens.
To remedy this, other states should cooperate by including in the calculation of ceiling amount
any amount already paid by this manufacturer in other states. If a jury in State B assesses
an amount that exceeds that imposed in State A, then the manufacturer should be compelled
to pay the excess into the fund. In this manner, the manufacturer would be subject to the
amount the harshest jury deemed appropriate. Realistically, states are not required to adhere
to the doctrines of other states. However, in light of the very important interest of every state
in not bankrupting manufacturers, it may not be unreasonable to expect other states to recognize
the amounts assessed in their sister states.
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fulfilled regardless of the amount any individual plaintiff receives
because that manufacturer will have already paid into the fund an
amount designed to punish that company. The purposes of extra compensation and law enforcement, however, may be better furthered with
some control over the amount each plaintiff receives so that the entire fund would not be depleted by the first one or two plaintiffs.
To serve this purpose, some control may be imposed mandating that
plaintiffs may recover in punitive damages amounts equivalent to their
compensatory damage awards.226 Since the amount of the compensatory liability would presumably be lower than an amount that a
jury would ordinarily determine appropriate for punitive damages,2' 7
the money in the fund would survive more than the first one or two
plaintiffs. Once the money in the fund was depleted, 228 plaintiffs would
no longer be able to recover ordinary punitive damage awards from
this defendant. These later plaintiffs may, however, be awarded their
costs of litigation and attorneys' fees if they prove the requisite punitive
damage elements against the manufacturer. 22 9 This result may seem
unfair to later plaintiffs. But in reality, the first plaintiff to prove
the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud has a very difficult and risky case to prove. 230 Later plaintiffs may gather evidence
from "pools" created by early plaintiffs. 21' Additionally, recall that
the primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter
misconduct. 232 The doctrine is only secondarily concerned with fairness
233
to the plaintiffs.
This suggested mechanism provides a flexible means of attaining
24
the goals of punitive damage awards in the market share context. 1
226.

This proposition could be as effectively implemented utilizing a percentage of the com-

pensatory award other than the equivalent. For example, two hundred percent of the compensatory amount may be appropriate. But see Model Uniform Product Liability Act §120, Analysis
Factor (8) (rejecting equivalent or multiple compensatory award proposition utilized in antitrust
actions as inappropriately inflexible in products liability cases).
227. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 3, at 15.

228. In the unlikely event that money remains in the fund after all possible plaintiffs have
either recovered or been precluded from recovery, a fair method of distributing the remainder
is warranted. A possible solution to this situation would be to turn the remaining money over

to the state. See Hodgkin & Veitch, supra note 101, at 132 (suggesting punitive damages should
go directly to the state).

229. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1325; Owen, supra note 11, at 49 n.227.
230. See Owen, supra note 78, at 1325. Enormous diligence, imagination, and financial
outlay is required of initial plaintiffs to discover and prove that a product manufacturer acted
with the malice required for proving a case for punitive damages. Id.
231. See, e.g., Asbestos Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication) (compilation of evidence for
asbestos litigation); Rheingold, supra note 178, at 122-24 (1968) (MER/29 evidence and
developments); DES Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication) (pool of DES evidence).
232. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
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The punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages would
be served as described. The extra compensation for hurt feelings and
loss of family and job security could to some extent be provided,
at least to the plaintiffs who receive judgment before the ceiling is
reached."' Additionally, the law enforcement goal would be promoted
because victims would have incentive to bring actions for punitive
damages since they could receive a windfall.23 6
CONCLUSION

California should maintain the spirit and reasoning of Sindell when
attempting to decide the punitive damages issue left unanswered in
that case. Plaintiffs who are injured by generic products should not
be denied recovery because they are unable to identify which of a
number of manufacturers produced the defective object that caused
their injuries. In line with this reasoning is the idea that a manufacturer who recklessly or intentionally injures another should not escape
punitive damages because victims of that manufacturer are unable
to trace the product back to that producer. California public policy
and the Sindell reasoning warrant the imposition of punitive damages
in market share cases. The only valid reason for denying punitive
liability in market share cases would seem to be the threat of bankrupting manufacturers. If this threat exists at all, then the threat exists
in all mass tort situations. Obviously, disallowing punitive damages
in any products liability action in which there may be a large number
of plaintiffs would be contrary to public policy. This would encourage
large manufacturers to engage in profitable misconduct. Therefore,
the best solution is to create a mechanism for distributing the punitive
awards so as not to subject a manufacturer to unlimited liability.2 37
Since the solution suggested by this comment can be adopted in practical fairness to all, California should not hesitate to impose punitive
damages on manufacturers who have acted in a malicious, fraudulent,
or oppressive manner.
Annabelle Moore
235. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
237. Ideally, this proposed system for controlling the imposition and distribution of punitive
damages would be enacted by Congress pursuant to the authority granted that body in the
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (commerce clause). Federal legislation in this
area would promote uniformity of the system within the states that have relaxed their causation requirements. In the alternative, however, the California State Legislature should enact
statutes providing for this suggested mechanism.
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